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COMMENTS
The Act of State Doctrine after Sabbatino
The United States Supreme Court recently decided, in Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 1 that American courts must enforce a
recognized foreign government's expropriation decree2 even though
the decree violates international law. The Court, contrary to the
views of respected international lawyers,3 found this result dictated
by the "act of state doctrine," which bars American courts from
reviewing the validity of another nation's official acts. 4 The decision,
amid frequent revolutionary confiscations and national programs of
expropriation,5 seriously draws into question the wisdom of further
investments in developing countries. 6 This is unfortunate because
American foreign investments benefit the receiving country as well
as the investor and ultimately contribute to international cooperation
and world peace. 7 This comment explores the meaning and scope
of the act of state doctrine, as the Supreme Court applied it in
Sabbatino.
I. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), reversing 307 F.2d
845 (2d Cir. 1962) [hereinafter referred to in text as Sabbatino and cited as principal
case]. The major exception to act of state immunity for foreign acts of state occurs when
the State Department relieves the court of the restraint upon its jurisdiction by official
notification-the so-called Bernstein letter-that the executive does not object to
judicial review of the foreign act in question. Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954), reversing 173 F.2d 71
(2d Cir. 1949). In the principal case, the Court expressly refused to consider the scope
or continuing validity of the Bernstein exception. Principal case at 420, 436.
2. "Expropriation" is the taking or using of property by public authority with
adequate compensation, while "confiscation" is the taking of property without adequate compensation. See RE, FOREIGN CONFISCATION IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw 12 (1951).
Normally, however, neither courts nor attorneys use these terms precisely. In the text,
reference is made to Cuba's taking as an expropriation decree despite the Court's
finding that it was confiscatory because the plan for compensation was illusory.
Principal case at 401-02.
3. See, e.g., COMM. ON INT'L LAw OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW
YORK, REPORT, A CONSIDERATION OF THE Acr OF STATE DocnuNE IN UNITED STATES
COURTS (1959); Hyde, The Act of State Doctrine and The Rule of Law, 53 AM. J. INT'L
L. 635 (1959); Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959). But
see Reeves, Act of State Doctrine and the Rule of Law-A Reply, 54 AM. J. INT'L L.
141 (1960).
4. See note 20 infra and accompanying text.
5. Seizures of private foreign investments have recently occurred in Brazil, Ceylon,
Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq and Iran, to name just a few. COMM. ON INT'L TRADE AND
INV., SEcrION OF INT'L & COMP. LAW, ABA, REPORT ON THE PROTEGrION OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY INVESTED ABROAD 2 (1963). See generally Dawson & Weston, Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino: New Wine in Old Bottles, 31 U. Cm. L. REv. 63, 67-72 (1963).
6. See generally Lillich, The Protection of Foreign Investment and the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1962, 17 RUTGERS L. REv. 405-07 (1963).
7. Remarks by Roger M. Blough, The William Penn Award Dinner of the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce, May 19, 1964, in U.S. Steel Corp., The Tie That Binds
5-6 (undated pamphlet).
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FACTS

In February and July of 1960, a New York commodity broker
contracted to purchase sugar from C.A.V.,8 a Cuban corporation
owned almost entirely by American nationals.9 When, on July 6,
1960, the United States Congress amended the Sugar Act of 194810
to permit the President to reduce the sugar quota allotted to Cuba,11
the Cuban Council of Ministers responded by authorizing the expropriation of American property in Cuba. 12 Pursuant to this decree,
the Cuban government promulgated a resolution expressly nationalizing C.A.V. and its subsidiaries.13 As a condition of permitting the
sugar to be transported from Cuba, the government exacted a second
purchase contract from the broker, which it then assigned to Banco
Nacional, a Cuban governmental agency. When the broker resold the
sugar, a New York state court, finding C.A.V. to have been the rightful ovmer, awarded the proceeds to a New York receiver appointed
to manage the assets of C.A.V. 14
Banco Nacional then brought an action in a federal district court
against both the broker and the receiver, alleging conversion of the
sale proceeds. The broker defended by challenging Cuba's claim of
title to the sugar, arguing that the purported expropriation failed to
pass title to the sugar to the Cuban government because the taking
violated international law. Banco Nacional, relying on the act of
state doctrine, asserted that American courts may not question the
validity of its title obtained by expropriation. The district court
ruled that, while the doctrine precludes courts from testing the
validity of the seizure under Cuban law or under the forum's public
policy, it does not prevent such examination under principles of
international law. Having found the taking to be invalid under international law because discriminatory, confiscatory, and retaliatory,
the court granted summary judgment for the defendants.15 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, holding that Cuba's
8. Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba.
9. Principal case at 401.
IO. Act of July 6, 1960, § 3, 74 Stat. 330, amending 61 Stat. 933 (1947).
ll. The following day, July 7, 1960, the President greatly reduced the sugar quota
allotted to Cuba. Proc. No. 3355, 25 Fed. Reg. 6414 Ouly 1960).
12. Law No. 851, July 6, 1960, 22 Leyes del Gobiemo Provisional de la Revoluci6n
29 (Cuba), English translation in 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 822 (1961).
13. Exec. Power Res. No. 1 of August 6, 1960, English translation in 193 F. Supp.
375, 382-83 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
14. Schwartz v. Compania Azucarera Vertientes-Camaguey de Cuba, 28 Misc. 2d
355, 208 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct.), afj'd, 12 App. Div. 2d 506, 207 N.Y.S.2d 288 (1960)
(memorandum decision). N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 1202(a)(4) authorizes the appointment
of a receiver for the New York assets of nationalized foreign corporations.
15. 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Courts of other nations have reviewed expropriations under international law. See Mann, International Delinquencies Before
Municipal Courts, 70 L.Q. REv. 181 (1954).
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expropriation violated international law on the narrower ground
that the taking was not for a public purpose, but was designed instead
to discriminate against the United States and its nationals.16 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the act of state doctrine precludes judicial review of foreign acts of state regardless of any violation of international law. 17
II. THE Acr OF STATE Docrn.1NE
Under established principles of national sovereignty, a nation has
absolute authority to govern within its own territory unless restrained by a rule of international law.18 Consistent with this principle, although not required by international law,19 the act of state
doctrine provides that an act of a foreign state directed against persons or property within its territorial jurisdiction is immune from
review by American courts.20 An "act of state" requires the creation
and publication of the sovereign's will, the physical imposition of
the sovereign's will upon persons or property, and a judicial confi.rmation.21 It is "an act in which the state has determined or is
seeking to determine an interest of its own as a state, as distinguished
from an act in which the state is seeking to determine an interest of
a private nature."22 Typical acts within the doctrine are executive
16. 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962). See Falk, The Case of Banco Nadonal de Cuba v.
Sabbatino Before the Supreme Court of the United States, 9 How. L.J. 116, 120-22
(1963).
17. See note 1 supra. The Court concluded that "there are few if any issues in
international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on
a State's power to expropriate the property of aliens." Principal case at 428. Compare,
McNair, The Seizure of Property and Enterprises in Indonesia, 6 NETHERLANDS INT'L
L. REv. 218, 243-53 (1959) and REsTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 190-95 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962) [hereinafter cited as REsTATEMENT],
with Lissitzyn, International Law in a Divided World, INT'L CONCILIATION No. 542, at 46
(1963) and Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of
Universal International Law?, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 863 (1961).
18. The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (Mar•
shall, C.J.): "The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself." See
BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 162 (6th ed. 1963).
19. See 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 115 (Lauterpacht, 8th ed. 1955).
20. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897). See Comment, "Act of State"
Immunity, 57 YALE L.J. 108, 111-15 (1947).
21. Reeves, The Sabbatino Case: The Supreme Court of the United States Rejuts a
Proposed New Theory of Sovereign Relations and Restores the Act of State Doctrine,
32 FORDHAM L. REv. 631, 647-49 (1964). In Sabbatino, the sovereign's will appeared in
legislation and related resolutions; seizure occurred when Cuba refused to permit the
loaded vessel to depart; and, finally, judicial confirmation was inherent in the legislation because it expressly precluded judicial review by Cuban courts. Thus, the act
of state was complete.
22. INTERNATIONAL LAw 1N NATIONAL COURTS 64 (Third Cornell Summer Conference
on International Law 1960) [hereinafter cited as THIRD CORNELL SUMMER CONFERENCE].
"The expression, however, ••• obviously may, and is in fact often intended to,
include legislative and judicial acts such as a statute, decree or order, or a judgment
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and legislative measures giving effect to governmental decisions on
major issues of policy, such as ownership of property, taxation, regulation of business enterprise, and the distribution of goods in the
economy. Although foreign judgments presented for enforcement
are not acts of state,23 the seizure or sale of property pursuant thereto
must be recognized in American courts.24
An act of state, then, is an application of the right to govern; the
act of state doctrine is a foreign sovereign's recognition of that right.
Although not as widely accepted as the principle of sovereign immunity,211 this doctrine confers broader immunity, extending beyond
the sovereign to private parties claiming title under a governmental
act.26 The doctrine is generally regarded neither as a strict international obligation nor as a constitutional mandate, but as a judicial
restraint, self-imposed to avoid embarrassing the executive in the
conduct of foreign relations. 27 American courts have applied the
doctrine strictly, even though the foreign government had ceased to
exist before the suit was instituted28 or had not been recognized by
the United States at the time of the act in question.29 Moreover, it
has been applied even though the foreign state's act was illegal under
its own laws,30 illegal under international law,31 or contrary to the
forum's public policy.32
'
An exception to act of state immunity is made, however, if the
litigation involves a gross violation of United States public policy
and the Department of State expresses its approval of judicial review of the foreign state's act. In Bernstein v. N. V. NederlandscheAmerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 33 the Second Circuit considered an act by the German government that, in 1937, had compelled the transfer of title of a German merchant fleet. The court
of a superior Court." Mann, The Sacrosanctity of the Foreign Act of State, 59 L.Q.
R.Ev. 42 (1943).
23. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). "[F]oreign judgments which might equally
be regarded as emanations of state, have been challenged even in United States courts
on ground of fraud, fairness of procedure, existence of jurisdiction; and have also
been denied conclusive effect when there has been a lack of reciprocity. Zander, supra
note 3, at 833-34.
24. THlllD CORNELL SUMMER CONFERENCE 64.
25. See BISHOP, CASES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 550-620 (2d ed. 1962).
26. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
27. Principal case at 423. "It is a matter of international comity ••• not a matter
of jurisdiction." TH!llD CORNELL SUMMER CoNFERENCE, at 122 (comment by Judge Fahy).
28. E.g., Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 772 (1947).
29. E.g., M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933).
30. E.g., Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438,444 (2d Cir. 1940).
Accord, American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
31. Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
32. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246, 249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 772 (1947).
33. Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 210
F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954), rroersing 173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949).
·
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held that the validity of the transfer was not open to question in
American courts. However, upon receipt of a communication from
the State Department to the effect that its policy was "to relieve
American courts from any restraint upon the exercise of their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials," the
court granted a rehearing and reversed its decision. 84
In the typical act of state case, the former owner of property sues
the present mvner, an assignee of the expropriating government.85
The reluctance of a court to review the validity of the defendant's
title reflects, in part, a desire to render titles secure, for if the plaintiff is allowed to prevail the loss would fall upon a third-party purchaser for value, who could then be left without effective remedy
against the foreign government that sold the property. Therefore,
the defendant is permitted to invoke the act of state doctrine.36 In
such cases, the foreign government whose act is questioned is not a
litigant, nor is it directly affected by the decision. In addition to
this typical case, it may occur that the plaintiff, rather than the
defendant, will rely upon the doctrine to establish its right to property as against the pre-expropriation owner who has managed to
regain possession. Here again the doctrine seems applicable because
' security of titles is equally as desirable to protect plaintiffs as
defendants.87 However, if the plaintiff receiving the benefit of the
act of state doctrine is the sovereign itself, application of the doctrine can no longer be justified as securing titles because the expropriating state is not a purchaser for value. If rendering titles secure
were the doctrine's only justification, it would seem equitable to
hold that by submitting to the court's jurisdiction the sovereign has
waived its protection. But, as the Court emphasized in Sabbatino,
the doctrine is also intended to prevent disruption of the United
States' relations with the acting foreign government.
In Sabbatino the policy of securing titles was not directly under
consideration because it was the expropriating state itself, as plaintiff,
that invoked the act of state doctrine in its suit to enforce its own
expropriation decree.38 The United States, as amicus curiae, nevertheless argued that the doctrine should apply in all appropriate cases,
34. Ibid. In Sabbatino, the State Department urged application of the act of state
doctrine to the expropriation in question. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae,
pp. 9-11, reprinted in 2 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1009 (1963). The Court expressly refused to
consider the scope or the continuing vitality of the Bernstein exception. Principal case
at 420,436.
35. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
36. E.g., National Institute of Agrarian Reform v. Kane, 153 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1963). See generally Reeves, supra note 3; Zander, supra note 3.
37. Note, 75 HAR.v. L. REv. 1607, 1618 (1962).
38. THIRD CORNELL SUMMER CONFERENCE 72 (comment by Mr. Stevenson). The
decision "in effect, requires that all the force of the United States' judicial and executive agencies be utilized to protect property confiscated in violation of international
law except where the confiscating government has itself expressly agreed to the princi-
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whether invoked affirmatively or defensively. The administration of
the doctrine, it urged in its brief, should not encourage the private
use of force or deception against the acting foreign government or
its assignee, an obvious result if a distinction is drawn between the
typical suit in which the doctrine is invoked by the defendant and
a suit in which the doctrine is relied upon by plaintiff. On the separate question of whether the doctrine is properly applicable when
the expropriating state relies on the doctrine, the United States
argued that "An act of state dealing with title to property is nonetheless involved, and no beneficial purpose would be served by permitting Cuba's assignee for value, but not Cuba, to maintain suit on
the title."89
III. THE Sabbatino HOLDING
The Court did not discuss the question whether there is a meaningful difference between reliance on the act of state doctrine by
a defendant and such reliance by a plaintiff, although it implied that
there is none. The Court did specifically refuse, however, to disting1,1ish between suits by sovereign states and those brought by assignees, because to do so would require a difficult examination in
each case to determine if the private party suing as assignee had taken
the property in good faith. 40 The clear implication is that the doctrine applies in any case where the foreign act or decree is the proper
rule for decision, regardless of whether the acting state or its assignee
is plaintiff, defendant, or totally unconnected with that particular
litigation.41 The Court also rejected an attempt to challenge, by
means of a counterclaim, the validity of Cuba's expropriation. The
defendant, drawing an analogy between the act of state doctrine and
sovereign immunity, had argued that the plaintiff had waived act of
state immunity by filing the action, thus permitting a counterclaim.42
The Court answered that, "Since the act of state doctrine proscribes
a challenge to the validity of the Cuban expropriation decree in this
case, any counterclaim based on asserted invalidity must fail." 43
The Court asserted that the act of state doctrine derives neither
from the inherent nature of sovereignty, nor from international
law, nor from the Constitution; but because it reflects a "strong
sense" among the judiciary that passing on the validity of the acts of
foreign governments might "hinder rather than further this country's
pies it is violating." Stevenson, The State Department and Sabbatino-"Ev'n Victors
Are by Victories Undone," 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 707 (1964).
39. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, p. 24, reprinted in 2 INT'L LEG.
MAT, 1009 (1963).
40. Principal case at 437.
.
41. Cf. Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 14 N.E.2d 798
(1938).
42. Principal case at 438.
43. Id. at 439.
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pursuit of goals both for itself and for the community of nations as
a whole in the international sphere,"44 it does have "constitutional
underpinnings." The Court specifically suggested that, in pending
litigation, when international authorities conflict or the international
legal issue touches "sharply on national nerves," American courts
should refrain from fully exercising their jurisdiction. Thus, the
fundamental role of the act of state doctrine, as envisaged by Sabbatino, is to prevent international conflicts.
Because prior Supreme Court decisions had enunciated the doctrine in sweeping terms, 45 with little analysis or explanation, a rather
careful consideration of the holding seems appropriate:
"Therefore, rather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible
rule and all-encompassing rule in this case, we decide only that
the Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking of
property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit,
in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if the complaint
alleges that the taking violates customary international law." 46

I. "A taking." A country is free, absent a specific agreement,47
to "take" for public use any property located within its territory.48
A government may exercise this right in various ways, including
eminent domain, taxation, and the police power. Under the act of
state doctrine, a condition of recognizing the validity of a foreign act
of state is that the act be completed by actual possession of the property;49 an executory decree does not merit act of state immunity.
The Court stated that Cuba's restraint of the loaded vessel and its
insistence that a new contract be signed before releasing the vessel
"must be regarded for these purposes to have constituted an effective
taking of the sugar, vesting in Cuba C.A.V.'s property right in it.'' 50
44. Id. at 423. In our constitutional system the executive, rather than the judiciary
or the legislature, is assumed to have primary responsibility for these matters.
45. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897): "Every sovereign State is
bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of
one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory."
46. Principal case at 428.
47. "[T]hat kind of agreement is so rare as to be practically non-existent." Metzger,
Property in International Law, 50 VA. L. REv. 594, 608 (1964). See notes 78-82 infra
and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., R.EsrATEMENT § 190; FATOUROS, GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES TO FOREIGN
!NVESfORS 50-54 (1962).
49. See Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808).
50. Principal case at 414. (Emphasis added.) The treatment a government accords
its own nationals is considered a domestic affair, while the treatment a government
accords aliens is governed by international law and may give rise to international
claims. For purposes of the act of state doctrine, however, the nationality of the victim
is irrelevant, since the Court in Sabbatino refused to establish an exception to act of
state immunity when international law is violated.
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2. "Of property." No limitation on the kinds of property a government may take has ever been imposed under the act of state doctrine. In this respect, the only limitation is that the property be
within the jurisdiction of the acting government.51
3. "Within its own territory." Under conflict of laws rules, executory foreign decrees are enforced only to the extent that such
enforcement does not violate the public policy of the forum. 52 When
a decree is executed within the foreign state's own borders, however,
American courts are required by the act of state doctrine to ignore
the normal conflicts rules and to recognize the validity of the act as
well as its effects.53 On the other hand, if a state purports to transfer
title to property located outside its borders, act of state immunity
does not apply. 54 In Sabbatino, the act of state doctrine applied
because the sugar was located within the Cuban territory at the time
of expropriation.115
4. "By a foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized by
this country at the time of suit." The act of state doctrine applies
only to acts of a regime recognized by the executive as the governing
authority.156 During a revolution, for example, when opposing factions each claim to be the sole legitimate government, the executive's
official recognition of one of the claimants binds American courts to
apply act of state immunity to the official acts of that regime. 57 When
the expropriating state is a party to the litigation, the act of state
doctrine is justified by the need to avoid disturbing the peace of
nations. 158 It is obvious, therefore, that if the acting government no
longer exists, there is little possibility of adversely affecting our
foreign relations, and act of state immunity should not apply.159
51. REsl'ATEMENT § 190. The Court rejected the defendant's argument that Cuba
had merely attempted to expropriate contractual rights which had their locus elsewhere.
52. E.g., Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918). See generally
Paulsen 8c Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLuM. L. REv. 969
(1956).
53. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897); REsl'ATEMENT § 43.
54. See, e.g., Moscow Fire Ins. Co. v. Bank of New York 8c Trust Co., 280 N.Y. 286,
20 N.E.2d 758 (1939), affd per curiam, 309 U.S. 624 (1940). Courts nevertheless have
given extraterritorial effect to a foreign decree when it is required by an executive
agreement. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
55. In Sabbatino, the Court said that any Cuban action with regard to property not
within its jurisdiction would be ineffective. Principal case at 413 n.14. See Rodriguez
v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 311 F.2d 429 (5th Cir. 1962).
56. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); REsl'ATEMENT § 45.
57. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., supra note 56.
58. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
59. This is certainly true if a new foreign government has repudiated the government whose act is challenged, for then it might be more of an affront to the new
government to apply the acts of its predecessor as law than to refuse to do so. Falk,
'!he Complexity of Sabbatino, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 935, 943 (1964). In the Bernstein
case, the acting government was no longer in existence, so it is arguable that the court
of appeals should not even have discussed the act of state doctrine. THIRD CORNELL
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The minimum prerequisite for establishing the existence of a
government is that its agents be in control of the nation's administration, territory, and inhabitants. 60 But even when a regime is actually
exercising sovereignty in the name of a state, it may not be recognized
by other governments. 61 Once recognition occurs, the regime acquires equal status with other recognized members of the family of
nations and normally exchanges diplomatic representatives with the
recognizing state. The transition of a regime from actual existence
to recognition by other states has little relation to the authority of
the ruling group over its own territory, but is related instead to
matters of international diplomacy. 62
It has been argued that applications of the act of state doctrine
should not be limited to recognized governments and that the courts
themselves should determine the juridical status or existence of the
government. 63 In 1962, however, the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, without citing authority, asserted
that the doctrine applies only to acts performed "by a regime that is
recognized as the government of that state by the state asked to
examine the validity of the act." 64 This view contemplates that the
determination of whether the acting government is existing and
recognized be made by the executive branch.65 In Sabbatino, the
Court limited its holding to situations where the United States
recognizes the acting government, thereby apparently adopting the
Restatement view. But the Court did not expressly preclude the
application of act of state immunity to acts of unrecognized governments; thus the controversy cannot yet be considered fully settled.
Under the Restatement, it is not necessary for the acting state to
have been recognized at the time of the act in issue, although recognition must occur before entry of judgment in the case. This follows
from the retroactive recognition principle whereby "such recognition is retroactive in effect and validates all the actions and conduct
of the government so recognized from the commencement of its
existence." 66 The Court, by adding to its holding the phrase, "at the
time of suit," affirmed this element of the act of state doctrine.
The withdrawal of diplomatic representatives does not affect dipSuMMER CONFERENCE 75 (comment by Mr. Re). See note 1 supra and notes 3!l-!l4

supra and accompanying text.
60. Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 185-86 (1877). Even when no government is
recognized, the state may exist. See REsTATEMENT § 102, at 361-62.
61. 2 WHITEMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 1, at 3, 17-18 (1963).
62. See generally "WHITEMAN, op. cit. supra note 61, at 1-18.
63. RE, FOREIGN CONFISCATION IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAw 58-65 (1951). See M. Salimoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220, 186 N.E. 679 (1933).
64. REsTATEMENT § 45 (hereinafter referred to in text as Restatement].
65. See Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres S.A., 163 F.2d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 1947)
(Clark, J., dissenting).
66. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303 (1918).
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lomatic recognition, nor is a country considered unrecognized merely
because it becomes unfriendly. 67 It would seem, however, that if
diplomacy is the appropriate remedy for takings that violate international law, as the State Department insisted,68 the logical test for
application of the act of state doctrine would not be recognition, but
rather the maintenance of diplomatic relations.69
5. "In the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement
regarding controlling legal principles." It could be argued that this
element of the Court's holding seems to foreclose American courts
from ever using the principles of customary international law to review foreign acts of state affecting property, because no review is permitted unless the acting state has recognized the "controlling legal
principles" 70 by entering into an agreement which, by definition,
would be determinative without resort to principles of customary
international law. Besides treaties, conventions, protocols, and other
"contracts" between states, 71 agreements between a private party and
a state can establish such controlling principles. For example, underdeveloped countries sometimes execute "concession contracts" with
foreign nationals for the exploitation of natural resources. Often such
contracts contain a clause in which the government agrees not to expropriate the property of the foreign entrepreneur for a period of
time. If, during the term stipulated in the clause, the host country
exercises its "sovereign right" to take the foreign national's assets,
act of state immunity should not apply because there exists a controlling agreement. 72
However, the full scope of this "agreements" exception to act of
state immunity is difficult to assess. Even in the absence of an agreement expressly binding the country whose act is challenged, a court
might discover an "unambiguous agreement regarding controlling
legal principles" in customary international law. For example, it is
interesting to consider the effect of a United Nations' General Assembly resolution containing applicable legal principles. 73 The Gen67. WHITEMAN, op. cit. supra note 61, at 27.
68. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 28-29, reprinted in 2 INT'L
LEG. MAT. 1009 (1963).
69. Stevenson, supra note 38, at 710. Cf. Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 417 (1964).
70. Principal case at 428. However, the Court disclaimed the intention of broadly
foreclosing American courts from considering questions of international law. Id. at
430 n.34. Moreover, at several points in the opinion, the Court relied upon international law. Laylin, Holding Invalid Acts Contrary to International Law-A Force
Toward Compliance, PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. Sec'y OF INT'L LAW 33, 34-36 (1964).
71. For a brief survey of the existing treaty provisions affecting the security and
protection of United States property and investment in foreign countries, see COMM.
ON !NT'L TRADE 8e INV., SECTION OF !NT'L 8e COMP. LAW, ABA, REPORT ON THE PRO•
TECTION OF PRIVATE PROP.ER.TY INVESTED ABROAD 39-58 (1963).
72. Cf. Mann, State Contracts and State Responsibility, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 572 (1960).
But cf. Metzger, supra note 47, at 607.
73. In the United Nations during the past decade, member nations that need
capital have nevertheless sponsored a series of resolutions intended to declare their un-
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eral Assembly is not an international legislature, and its pronouncements are not law, but they constitute evidence of customary
international law in the absence of vocal protests by disapproving
members. 74 Moreover, there is some indication that, as underdeveloped nations acquire voting control of the Assembly, they are
seeking to raise its resolutions to the status of law. 75 Thus, if a foreign
government's expropriation were challenged under a relevant General Assembly resolution, it is not impossible that an American court
would consider the resolution an "unambiguous agreement regarding
legal principles" and refuse to apply the act of state doctrine. This
result is possible not only if the acting government voted for the
resolution but also if the resolution were passed by a large majority
and the acting government had failed to object.
More difficulty inheres in estimating the effect, under the "agreements" exception in Sabbatino, of pronouncements by a multinational convention for the protection of foreign investments76 that
is adhered to by most members of the family of nations but not
the country whose act is challenged. Such a treaty represents "the
customs and usages of civilized nations" and, therefore, constitutes
evidence of customary international law.77 In such a case, it is perhaps unlikely, but not impossible, that an American court would
find this to be an agreement containing controlling legal principles
and would refuse to apply act of state immunity.

IV.

FUTURE .APPLICATION OF THE

Acr OF STATE DOCTRINE

Because the Court restricted its holding to takings of property,78
foreign acts of state outside the expropriation area may be reviewed
by the courts even though there is no controlling written agreement.
More important, even when an expropriation occurred within
the territory of a "foreign sovereign government, extant and recognized at the time of suit," American courts still possess discretion
to review the act's validity under principles of customary interfettered sovereignty over the economic activities carried on in their countries. COMM.
ON !NT'L TRADE &: !NV., op. cit. supra note 71, at 10.
74. See generally Hyde, Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Wealth and Resources,
50 AM. J. !NT'L L. 854, 864-66 (1956); Sloan, The Binding Force of a "Recommenda•
tion" of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 25 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 1 (1948).
75. See statement of A. B. Perera of Ceylon. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc., 16th Sess.,
6th Comm. 131, (A/AC.6/SR.716) (1961); see other statements in the 6th Comm., 17th
Sess., particularly those by representatives of Iran (U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc., 17th
Sess., 6th Comm. 144 (A/AC.6/SR. 762) (1962), and Ceylon (id. at 149, SR. 76!1).
76. In the type of multilateral treaty most frequently proposed, the participating
nations would agree to certain basic rights that capital importing countries would
then assure to investing aliens. COMM. ON INT'L TRADE INv., op. cit supra note 71,
at 3.
77. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
78. Principal case at 428.
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national law rather than to apply the act of state doctrine. The
exercise of this discretion is to be governed by two broad standards.
First, act of state immunity should apply when the consensus as to
relevant international legal rules is insufficient to permit a court
competently to litigate the issue; the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of the law, the
more appropriate it is for courts to review foreign acts of state, since
then it is easier to restrict itself to "the sensitive task of establishing
a principle not inconsistent with the national interest or with international justice."79 Second, act of state immunity should apply when
the issue represents a battleground of conflicting ideologies; the
greater the extent to which the aspects of international law in issue
touch the political susceptibilities of states, the stronger the justification for exclusivity in the political branches, since decisions regarding such questions may carry important implications for our
foreign relations. 80 These carefully formulated standards, together
with the Court's pointed insistence that the scope of the act of state
doctrine must be determined by reference to "the balance of relevant considerations" 81 and its attempt to formulate a narrow holding,82 demonstrate that Sabbatino is not absolutist in nature.
The future application of the act of state doctrine must also be
considered broadly in its relation to American foreign policy. The
continuing cold war conflict, combined with the frightening development of nuclear weapons, make it imperative that international tension be relaxed whenever possible. Professor Falk argues that domestic courts can establish a "minimum trust in international relations"
and thereby contribute to world peace by adjudicating legal controversies so as to protect the autonomy of different socio-political
systems.
"Briefly the position is this: in general, municipal courts should
avoid interference in the domestic affairs of other states when
the subject matter of disputes illustrates a legitimate diversity of
values on the part of two national societies. In contrast, if the
diversity can be said to be illegitimate, as when it exhibits an
abuse of universal human rights, then domestic courts fulfill
their role by refusing to further the policy of the foreign legal
system." 88
79. Principal case at 428, 430 n.34.
Ibid.
Id. at 428.
Ibid.
Falk, Toward a Theory of the Participation of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order: A Critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 16 RUTGERS
L. R.Ev. 1, 7-8 (1961) (Emphasis added.) (footnote omitted.) "'Legitimate diversity' is a
phrase used to suggest that there is no global consensus in favor of making a single
substantive standard universal. Therefore, states are at liberty to adopt diverse national
standards. Such diversity is legitimate, in this sense, with respect to the practice of
80.
81.
82.
83.
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Members of the family of nations have organized their internal societies under different political and economic systems. Capitalist attitudes prevail in some parts of the world; socialist, in others. Underdeveloped countries stress the need for importing capital, while
capital-exporting countries are primarily concerned with protecting
foreign investors. Amid this diversity, however, there exists considerable consensus on matters of peace and human rights. 84 American courts can foster stability in international relations by refusing
to interfere with a legitimate diversity of economic policies. Expropriation of private property, the question involved in Sabbatino, is
such an economic policy. But when foreign acts of state abridge
fundamental human rights, American courts should resist the policy
of the foreign state and promote instead the world consensus. As suggested above,85 the Sabbatino opinion largely reflects this viewpoint,
and the Court's reasoning seems sufficiently flexible to permit future
application of the doctrine in accordance with Professor Falk's
theory. When governmental acts that violate human rights or other
standards well-supported by a global consensus are challenged in
American courts, the courts are free to reject act of state immunity.

v.

THE

ROLE OF LEGISLATION

The Court in Sab batino held that the scope of the act of state
doctrine is a matter of federal law,86 binding upon both the federal
and state courts. This is a logical corollary of the commitment of
foreign affairs to the national government; if these important matters
could be decided in fifty different ways by the states, great confusion
would result. The Court also concluded that act of state immunity
is a judicial doctrine, required neither by international law nor by
the Constitution. 87 These conclusions suggest that a congressional
either socialism or capitalism, but not for the choice belween upholding civil liberties
or practicing genocide." Falk, The Case of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino
Before the Supreme Court of the United Sta1es, 9 How. L.J. 116, 125 n.29 (1963).
84. Falk, Jurisdiction, Immunities, and Act of State: Suggestions for a Modified
Approach, ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION 1, 5-6 (1961).
85. See notes 79-82 supra and accompanying text. But the Court may have misapplied this theory because, while all nations recognize that aliens deprived of property should· be given some compensation, the Court applied act of state immunity to
Cuba's expropriation even though the compensation plan was illusory. Note, 8 A.B.A.
SECTION OF INT'L 8: COMP. L. BULL. 28, 31-32 (1964).
86. The Court stated: "[W]e are constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary
and the National Executive in ordering our relationships with other members of the
international community must be treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law."
Principal case at 425. Its declaration that the doctrine was federal law binding on the
states amounted to a determination that judicially formulated federal common law
could be controlling in state courts. See generally Henkin, .The Foreign Affairs Power
of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 CoLUM. L. REv. 805 (1964).
87. Principal case at 423.
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act requiring American courts to apply international law as the rule
of decision in act of state cases would be upheld. 88 On October 7,
1964, the President signed into law the Foreign Assistance Act of
1964, containing a provision89 overruling the Sabbatino precedent.90
Introduced as a Senate amendment, the new legislation provides that
American courts may not refuse to examine the validity of foreign
acts of state alleged to be contrary to international law. Thus, a
party who has suffered an expropriation in violation of international
law may now bring suit to assert his claim to any of the expropriated
property that later comes within the jurisdiction of the United States.
The new legislation is particularly interesting because of its restrictive terms. The provision extends only to takings of property
occurring after January I, 1959,91 and then only if international law
has been violated. The act of state doctrine still applies, therefore, in
the large category of act of state cases in which international legal
principles are not violated. The legislation is also inapplicable if the
case involves rights acquired pursuant to a short-term irrevocable
letter of credit issued in good faith prior to the foreign state's expropriation. Moreover, the rule is temporary, not applying to any case
in which the proceedings are commenced after January I, 1966. Finally, act of state immunity will apply as before if the court receives
a suggestion on behalf of the President to the effect that application
of the doctrine in the particular case is required to protect foreign
policy interests of the United States.
88. Henkin, supra note 86, at 823: "There can be little doubt that the Court would
have to follow modifications in Act of State by act of Congress •.•."
89. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964 § 30l(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1013 (1964): " ••• notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall decline on
the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits
giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a claim of title
or other right is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or a party claiming
through such state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking after
January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of the principles of international
law, including the principles of compensation and the other standards set out in this
sub-section: Provided, That this subparagraph shall not be applicable (1) in any case
in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to international law or with respect
to a claim of title or other right acquired pursuant to an irrevocable letter of credit of
not more than 180 days duration issued in good faith prior to the time of the confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any case with respect to which the President determines that application of the act of state doctrine is required in that particular case
by the foreign policy interests of the United States and a suggestion to this effect is
filed on his behalf in that case with the court, or (3) in any case in which the
proceedings are commenced after January I, 1966."
90. 110 CONG, REc. 18935 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1964) (excerpt from report of Committee on Foreign Relations). But the new law does not affect the result in Sabbatino
itself. Id. at 18946 (Hickenlooper memorandum). The Executive Branch strongly opposed the measure. Hearings on Foreign Assistance Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 618-19 (1964).
91. This date marks Castro's takeover in Cuba. 110 CONG. REc. 18935 (daily ed.
Aug. 14, 1964) (\Vashington Post editorial).
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Carefully drafted legislation is probably more effective than
sporadic judicial decisions in discouraging foreign seizures of property.92 It was argued that this modification of the Sabbatino decision
will help deter expropriations by giving notice to the foreign state
that the product of expropriations violating international law cannot
be brought within the jurisdiction of the United States without risk
of litigation.93 But this provision, overshadowed by the violent debate
on the reapportionment rider, was not subjected to thorough study
and full hearings. 94 Complete review of the matter by the relevant
congressional committees is planned for the Eighty-ninth Congress to
determine the need for permanent legislation.95
VI.

CONCLUSION

While the Sabbatino case endorses the act of state doctrine, it does
not formulate the absolute rule that, even though the foreign act of
state is alleged to violate international law, an American court is
powerless to act in the absence of a Bernstein letter. Rather, it holds
that, while American courts may not review the validity of expropriations under customary international law, they may review all
governmental acts, including expropriations, that violate "a treaty
or other unambiguous agreement." 96 Moreover, Sabbatino urges
courts to approach act of state cases flexibly, determining whether
the policies underlying the doctrine would be served by its application in the particular case.97 Even when the specific prerequisites
for act of state immunity-execution of the act of state within the
territory of a presently existing and recognized foreign government
-are fulfilled, an American court may proceed to review the act's
validity if it determines that a consensus of the world community
of nations exists supporting the customary rule violated by the act
in question and that the case has no important bearing on the conduct of foreign relations. The Sabbatino rule, therefore, seems to
be in the mainstream of policy-oriented jurisprudence.

William ]. Bogaard
92. See Laylin, supra note 70, at 36-38.
93. 110 CoNG. REc. 18948 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1964) (rebuttal to Executive Branch
Position Paper).
94. 110 CoNG. REc. 22656 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1964) (conference report).
95. Ibid.
96. Principal case at 428.
97. See notes 79-82 supra and accompanying text.

